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Abstract: Despite recognizing that ethics is integral to design, and despite awareness
that design brings about risks and undesirable side and after-effects, design ethics
remains critically under-developed. What is design ethics? How should one broach an
area as vast as design ethics? In this article, I examine three discourses that have
been commonly used to engage—and to provoke—moral reasoning, awareness, and
action in design. They are namely, technology, sustainability, and responsibility.
Within the defined area of each discourse, I examine a limited set of debates and
issues that are relevant to design ethics today. Through this critical analysis, I raise
new questions and issues for design ethics. Subsequently, I suggest how a
theoretically robust design ethics ought to engage with the concepts and categories
of applied ethics on the one hand, and on the other, to condition this engagement
with the domain-specific interests, concerns and experiences of design.
Keywords: Design; Ethics; Technology; Responsibility

1. Introduction
Despite the recognition that ethics is integral to design and design practices (d’Anjou, 2010;
Devon & van de Poel, 2004; Findeli, 1994; Flusser, 1999; Fry, 2004; Manzini, 2006; Mitcham,
1995; Steen, 2015; Zelenko & Felton, 2012), design ethics remains “massively
underdeveloped and even in its crudest forms remains marginal within design education”
(Fry, 2009: 3). Design ethics—which is the study of morals and morality in design practices,
and which encapsulates knowledge that evaluates, justifies and guides design—has yet to
catch up with the extensive phenomenon of the “world as design” (Aicher, 1994). In an age
when what used to be matters of destiny have now become novel burdens for decisionmaking (Ihde, 1990), the underdeveloped state of design ethics is perplexing. Naturally, this
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0
International License.
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begs the question: why has design ethics lagged so far behind the reach and ramifications of
design actions today?
The reasons are manifold. First, design ethics concerns a vast area overlapping many
independent fields of applied ethics—for instance, the ethics of technology, robot ethics and
environmental ethics just to name three. Each of these fields maintains discourses that
overlap with the substantive concerns of design ethics. Yet none of these fields, to the
author’s knowledge, explicitly reference design or design theory. For instance, robot ethics
connotes three different areas of concern, namely, understanding the ethical implications of
robotic usage in society, the moral code used by the robots themselves, and finally,
discussion revolving around the self-conscious ability of ethical reasoning in robots (Veruggio
& Abney, 2012). Conceivably, all three areas concern design intentions and consequences.
But this discourse has yet to draw from design theory gainfully. Or consider the debate on
ecological restoration (see Gobster & Hull, 2000): a key (and active) discourse within
environmental ethics. However, the question of whether it is ethical—or to what extent it is
ethical—to first degrade a tract of the natural environment and then later restore it is also
rightfully, a question of (environmental) design ethics. If these examples are symptomatic of
a larger trend, then design ethics has yet to be significantly informed by important debates
and issues outside of design. It is therefore important to draw on some of these debates and
issues to further develop design ethics.
Second, ethics is challenging for design because it does not exactly fall into the professional
competences of designers (Findeli, 1994). Ethics presumes not only specialized knowledge
but also demands emotive engagement. Unlike cognitive problem-solving, moral reasoning
requires not only cognitive processing but also “total moral engagement on the actor’s part”
(Findeli, 1994: 60). The moral (action), according to Bauman (1993: 54), resists “codification,
formalization, socialization, universalization”. To calculate if one should jump in to save a
drowning child would be immoral (Løgstrup, 2007: 85). But because design is essentially an
activity characterized by distant “projectability” (Bonsiepe, 2010: 36), design also tends to
deny any immediate emotive engagement that ethics presumably requires. To add to this,
design problems are frequently ill-defined, if not outright “wicked” (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
Moral values in design and commitment to these values only become clearer as designers
struggle through the problem; these values are rarely present by default at the outset of
design.
Finally, ethics could be categorized under what Schumacher (2004) suggests as divergent
problems. In contrast to convergent problems—where successive attempts to solve the
problem gradually coalesce and converge on an answer, a divergent problem becomes more
divergent the more it is clarified and logically developed—until “some of them appear to be
the exact opposite of the others” (Schumacher, 2004: 122). Ought one lavish a year’s wages
to honour a noble person who is about to be executed, or use that lavish sum to help the
poor? Should one stay behind to take care of an elderly relative or leave to join the fight
against an evil empire? Or should a designer abide by his convictions at the expense of
admitting to undesirable consequences, or to avoid these consequences at the expense of
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abandoning his convictions (Weber, 1981)? These are stark dilemmas. Yet even in their
reductive starkness each depicts some of the deepest moral perplexities of the human
condition. Is there then any overriding principle to resolve these dilemmas? Or how should
consequences be weighed against integrity, or vice versa? To the extent that the field of
ethics offers answers to these questions, the answers tend to be diametrically different. In
this way, they only reflect the highly pixelated landscape of contemporary ethics today
comprising of many divergent frameworks and arguments. While there is great richness in
divergence, it is tantamount to an intractable complexity for ethical guidance—which makes
for an extremely challenging task of finding out just what is the ethical thing to do in design.
However, admitting that obstacles exist for design ethics is not the same as denying its
plausibility. Despite obvious difficulties and challenges, different design theorists and
practitioners have persisted in envisioning and articulating a design ethics that can inform,
clarify, and improve design practices. This task is all the more pressing when designers can
no longer count on social norms to provide guidance in many matters of new technology and
design (Flusser, 1999). In this context, design ethics is crucial for raising moral awareness,
evaluating moral intuitions and clarifying the ethical dimension in design decision-making.
Developing the substantive content and guiding vectors of this ethics is therefore a next
important step.

1.1 Methods and Aims of Paper
My arguments in this paper follows from the following three premises: (i) design ethics
remains under-developed; (ii) but discourses on design ethics—both within and outside of
design—exists; (iii) however, little, if any, effort has been devoted to collate and analyze
these discourses used to engage the ethical in design. Therefore, a critical survey of a
relevant but limited set of issues in each of these discourses—which are namely, technology,
sustainability, and responsibility—to further clarify and consolidate design ethics is
warranted.
However, this survey is hardly comprehensive. This survey only attempts to identify a limited
number of ideas cogent and emergent to design ethics in these discourses. Through this
effort, my arguments raise new issues and questions for future work in design ethics.
Recognizably, each discourse is vast and the enterprise of many book-length endeavors;
where I have chosen to start in each of these vast discourses is therefore to some extent,
idiosyncratic. But the choice of these starting points is not entirely inexplicable. Where
possible, I begin from canonical origins; in other places I construct my own premises—all
with the aim of conveying concisely the kernel of each discourse as it relates to design
ethics. And finally, while the broader choice for these three specific discourses may be
charged as a case of biased sampling on the dependent variables, each is however replete
with literature and data that can spur further discussion in design ethics. If the author is
guilty of biased sampling, then it is only because the author has to begin from the most likely
places.
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2. Technology: from Instrumentality to the Morality of Things?
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) could be credited with one of the earliest insights on the
moral ruptures brought about by modern technology on mankind. According to Heidegger
(2004), modern technology has transformed the moral relations between person to person,
and of persons to the world. Instead of treating persons or certain entities in the world as
ends in themselves, they have been transformed into means by modern technology. In other
words, modern technology, among other attributes, has precipitated the nihilism of absolute
instrumentality.
But this nihilism never quite materialized. What emerged instead was the triumphalism of
means, where means became its own absolute ends. For instance, where is that fastest car
in the world going? What are the reasons for building the tallest building? And why is a
watch that answers our phone calls even necessary? Rittel calls this phenomenon the “curse
of feasibility” (Protzen & Harris, 2010: 223): ‘I do because I can’. In parallel, C.W. Churchman
suggests that the most startling feature of the 20 th century is that mankind has developed
such elaborate ways of doing things while at the same time have developed no way of
justifying for any one of them (Churchman, 1961: 1). Indeed, the more pronounced and
articulated technology becomes, the more humanity is exposed to the unanticipated side
effects and risks of harnessing technology (Wolin, 2001). And attempting to address these
side effects and risks with more technology only perpetuates the cycle of unanticipated and
undesirable side and after effects (Beck, 1992; Findeli, 1994). The power, as the willingness,
to harness technology has far exceeded the capacity to know its actual consequences, and
this in turn creates a class of new problems that behoves a new ethic, hence the ethic of
responsibility (Jonas, 1984).
Even so, the arguments mounted by Jonas and others on technology and ethics are often
“defined in reference to large choices” (Manzini, 1992: 5). Manzini (1992) suggests there are
few hints in these arguments for constructing a system of values—an ethics of design—for
everyday design decisions. To the extent that Manzini is correct, little insight has been
transferred from the macro-ethics of technology to everyday design practices. And to the
extent Jonas’s arguments remain valid, the triumphalism of means persists. Often, there is
little substantive justification for why many technologies and products exist except for
reasons of frivolity and increasingly, because of reckless greed. Like in Jonas’s milieu, the
future of this present age remains at risk—and in part due to design (Fry, 2009). Presently,
design facilitates the ceaseless cycles of new product development, which in turn legitimize
design. In this context, design and design ethics can be self-critical but it cannot do so
without also being threatened by self-negation. Therefore, there is little design ethics can do
in this paradigm of technology beyond tinkling warning bells (see Beck & Willms, 2004: 204).
Is there then another paradigm to develop design ethics in relation to technology? A patchy
discourse on the morality and moral mediation of artefacts has emerged (Chan, 2015;
Flusser, 1999; Latour, 1992; Tonkinwise, 2004; Verbeek, 2008; Verbeek, 2011). Unlike the
instrumentalist paradigm of technology where technology is perceived to be external to
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moral choices, this discourse posits technology as a mediator in moral choices. In the
instrumentalist paradigm, technology is either used or being abused by the moral agent;
technology is a value-neutral entity and ethical attributes only reside within the agent. By
extension, an ethics of technology associated to this instrumentalist paradigm could only ask
if the ends justify the means, or whether certain consequences are justifiable, and by what
ethics, and to what extent is the agent virtuous or not in the use of technology. In other
words, this paradigm would only admit to the view that moral agency begins and ends with
the human, moral agent.
But in the mediation paradigm, it is no longer clear if moral agency resides in the human
agent alone. In this paradigm, moral agency is seen as the outcome of an assemblage made
up of human agents and technology. And while the exact extent of technological mediation
remains unclear, the example of the obstetrical ultrasound technology goes to show how
the moral assemblage comprising of doctors, patient, foetus and technology has been
altered because of ultrasound (Verbeek, 2008). In this case, the visualization offered by
obstetrical ultrasound has opened up new moral choices that were previously unavailable.
And even if one demurs on this view, one is unable to deny that design parameters in
technology—for example choosing to represent the foetus at a certain size on the viewing
monitor to accentuate its personhood (Verbeek, 2011)—directly implicate design ethics.
Admittedly, there is still little consensus on the mediation paradigm (see Chan, 2015). In
Verbeek’s case, he suggests that the mediation paradigm of technology is at least useful to
design on two counts (Verbeek, 2008). First, this paradigm is able to develop a moral
assessment of technologies in terms of their mediating roles. And second, ethics is able to
shift from the domain of language to medium of materiality. In the context of design ethics, I
suggest that it is the latter suggestion that invites further reflection. To the extent that ethics
can be materialized, ethics has to be designed. A recent thought experiment carried out at
the University of Alabama (Birmingham) asks if self-driving cars—or autonomous vehicles—
should be programmed to ‘murder’ its occupants, rather than to kill the pedestrians in the
event of the classic Trolley problem (Windsor, 2015). There are varying forms of the Trolley
problem; but all of them comprise of a moral dilemma between invoking a deliberate
intentional harm, or to reject that intent in favour of some unpalatable consequences (e.g.,
between intervening by intentionally running the trolley into an innocent bystander, or to do
nothing and allow the trolley to run into a small group of bystanders). In designing these
autonomous technologies, it has become clear that designers can no longer avoid the
subject of morality in technologies. If so, then it is not so much a question if mediation exists
but to what extent mediation occurs and at what point does this mediation begin to assume
a moral agency similar to the human agent. Invariably, one then has to ask: can a designer
ever be responsible enough to determine, on behalf of other moral agents, the ethical action
through design?
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3. Sustainability: a Paradox for Design?
“Everything now has to be sustainable…” (Bruckner, 2013: 47). Sustainability has become the
hegemonic social ethic today. And to this extent, the term ‘sustainability’ has also become
almost meaningless (Russ, 2010). In design and elsewhere, this term has taken on a wide
gamut of different meanings—everything from limiting the impacts of design on the
environment to a moral obligation for future generations, and perhaps even to an
assuagement for increasing consumption. But scrutinized more closely, sustainable design
today raises many disconcerting questions.
From one perspective, Fry (2012) suggests that market growth constantly negates the
impact reduction gains of sustainable products. Sustainable design, which by one
formulation is at least to reduce the impact of design on the environment, is nullified when
the scale of its realization in material and energy consumption exceeds its aggregate impact
reductions. The Jevons’ Paradox and the Rebound Effect are two other well-studied
phenomena that point to the paradoxical possibility when widespread adoption of
sustainable design can turn out to undermine the original aims for sustainability. From
another critical perspective, sustainable design is perceived to have been hijacked and
appropriated by agendas wholly unfamiliar and perhaps even inimical to its original meaning
for its morally approbative cover. The highly engineered ‘eco-cities’ are indeed forms of
sustainable development in terms of environmental performance; but incurring the various
costs associated to building new cities when existing ones still offer ample opportunities for
efficient re-adaptation is not sustainable. Harvey (2010) suggests that (new) urbanization is
but a channel to absorb excess capital to better stabilize capitalism. These two perspectives
do not nullify the need for sustainable design. But they do behove a closer scrutiny of what
sustainability and sustainable design appear to promise.
Because sustainable design is a vast discourse, I shall only limit my arguments to two issues
relevant to design ethics. Firstly, sustainability tends to suggest values associated to
conservation, limited use or even, preservation of limited and especially, non-renewable
resources. On the other hand, design tends to suggest values associated to exploration,
experimentalism and expansiveness. In other words, sustainability tends to have prefigured
aims; design does not. And while sustainability appears to constrain or even restricts, design
assumes nearly the opposite. Admittedly, this relationship is more complex than how it has
been portrayed; after all, it is possible to engage in exploratory and experimental design
without consuming non-renewable resources. Yet to design is to admit to an openendedness—that is, to experience epistemic freedom (d’Anjou, 2010; Protzen & Harris,
2010)—that is radically different from the boundedness suggested by the prefigured aims of
sustainability.
On this, how designers modulate this freedom in relation to sustainability is telling. In
contrast to d’Anjou’s (2010) view on embracing a kind of Satrean freedom in design, Rittel
argues that such Satrean freedom instead inhibits designers. To design, the designer has to
limit this freedom by imposing some kind of boundaries—tantamount to the imposition of
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constraining logics (i.e., ‘Sachswange’) found outside the immediate system of design
(Protzen & Harris, 2010: 192). In other words, complete or radical freedom overwhelms as it
also paralyzes (Fromm, 1994). In this context, sustainable standards and norms then easily
become a source of self-justifying constraints used to initiate and to justify design. The
ecologically justified showcase village of Huangbaiyu is a case in point (see May, 2011),
where existing, local and arguably sustainable practices were eliminated in favour for the
sustainable forms imposed by the designers. Because sustainability is morally approbative
and because design is also incentivized by various institutions (e.g., Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design, or LEED) to promote sustainability today, the designer can be led into
the moral hazard of prescribing unnecessary ‘sustainable’ features that ought to be avoided
in the first place.
Secondly, while it is possible to design for non-human interests, overwhelmingly design has
been deployed to serve human interests. The primacy of positioning human interests first
above all other interests can be argued as a form of anthropocentricism (Sarkar, 2012), and
anthropocentricism has been argued as the source of the environmental crisis today
(Rolston, 2012). Admittedly, not all forms of anthropocentric activities are harmful to the
environment; irrigation technologies used in certain conditions, for example, has led to the
flourishing of biodiversities that otherwise would not occur naturally. Even so—visibly and
overwhelmingly—the primacy of anthropocentricism has resulted in rapacious exploitation,
environmental degradation, destruction of non-human species, and harmful wastes: “where
design is, there is waste” (Bauman, 2004: 30). If so, then to what extent is it possible to
concede to design ethics, when the subject matter of this ethics—design—underwrites the
very source of the environmental threat itself?
On this point, design ethics today has little to say. The hegemony of sustainable design has
endorsed the belief that design is needed to create a more sustainable world. But at the
same time, this same belief also conceals the damage design is incurring. To some extent,
this belief is not reproachable, for “things cannot be made ethical without design” (Fry,
2012: 220). Yet because a robust design ethics has to be self-critical, it is equally important
for designers to question and to confront the various anthropocentric causes that they serve
or materialize through design (Fry, 2004). Even so, this dilemma is not entirely up to design
to resolve. After all, there is still little consensus today on how to value non-human species
independent of anthropocentric values. Until there is knowledge and consensus on how to
value non-human species, design cannot be actualized to serve non-human causes. In the
absence of this non-anthropocentric valuation system, the obvious recourse is then to
establish areas of conservation, tantamount to natural protectorates, where tracts of natural
environment and natural species are protected from further impacts of human actions. But
on this, the irony cannot be more profound: by creating these protectorates, humans have
once more accentuated the distinction between our artificial world, and the natural world
(Rolston, 2012). In doing so, this has just thrown anthropocentricism into a sharper relief—
and once again, by design.
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4. Responsibility: A Question of Design?
What is responsibility in design? According to Fry (2004), responsibility in design has so far
been problematically understood and defined—and mostly not going beyond the obligation
for professional due diligence. Generally, responsibility has been portrayed in the following
two ways (Fry, 2004): the first entails responsibility to clients and users in the form of a
professional ethic or code of conduct; the second admits to a broader social responsibility
not unlike what Papanek (1985: 54) suggests as the “social and moral responsibilities of
design”. To the extent that this distinction is warranted, it has been made on practical
grounds. Different professional codes—for example, in architecture, planning and
engineering—are needed to address problems and issues peculiar to these different design
professions. In other words, this distinguishes a responsibility to clients, superiors and rules,
from a responsibility for the welfare of others and the environment (Bauman, 2001).
Justly, Fry (2004) argues that the delimited sense of professional ethic as ‘responsibility to’ is
inadequate for evaluating the deeper premises of design projects and the broader impacts
of the designed artefact. After all, a ‘responsibility to’ rules, norms and superiors makes one
unwilling to stand up against dominant institutions or question them even when moral
judgment calls for resistance (Bauman, 2001). Along this line of thought, Marcuse (1976)
suggests that professional ethics tends to affirm and consolidate the status quo, and it
cannot be relied upon to improve social inequities. For these reasons, professional ethic as
‘responsibility to’ is necessary but not sufficient in guiding the responsible designer. Yet even
if one turns to the perceivably broader—and more ontological—‘responsibility for’, this
venue poses its own challenges. Responsibility is inexorably always personal and contextual;
one is beholden to a specific another, which forms the kernel of responsibility. Therefore,
this ‘responsibility for’ the welfare of others and the environment may very well play an
aspirational role for the responsible designer. But to demand anything beyond this is to
venture into a philosophy that leaves duty without a context, and one that risks obscuring
the relation between virtue and reality (Murdoch, 2014: 89).
To bypass this obstacle, it has been suggested that design education offers a venue for
teaching responsible creativity (Maldonado, 1965). Along this line of thinking, being
responsible is less about knowing a priori definitions of what responsibility entails, but more
about the a posteri task of cultivating a morally responsible designer. A person can know
what is good, yet refuses to do it (Aristotle, 2005). But a good person by definition, does
what is good and proper. Even so, there is some tentativeness in relying on education to
cultivate moral character (Findeli, 2001). This tentativeness is not without reasons: for in the
context of a pluralistic and liberal society, it is not only difficult to decide what kind of moral
character one should cultivate, but also that character education implies the questionable
inculcation of desirable traits and virtues (Doris, 2003)—but whose desirable traits and
virtues, one asks? More troublingly, Doris (2003) also discovers that moral behaviour is
extraordinarily sensitive to variation in circumstance. Drawing on evidence from moral
psychology, Doris questions if there is even such a thing as a ‘moral character’—an attribute
that all practices of character education must first presume.

3546

From Afterthought to Precondition

But counter-arguments are no less compelling: not only are the methods and choice of
subjects of many experiments in moral psychology questionable, but also importantly, they
rely on fictional moral scenarios to draw conclusions of actual moral realities (Damon &
Colby, 2015). Damon and Colby argue that even if one accepts the moderating influence of
circumstances on moral behaviour, one cannot deny the evidence of a sustained dedication
to a moral cause in cases they have studied, which they further suggest as evidence of moral
character. Because philosophical horns remain locked on this debate, and because there are
also well-justified opposition to character education in liberal societies, it is uncertain—
insofar as the science and evidences go—if design education can hope to teach anything
more than basic moral reasoning skills and theories in training the responsible designer.
Clearly then, whether one advances by first specifying what responsibility entails for design,
or ventures into virtue ethics as character education, one encounters nearly insurmountable
obstacles. Is there another way to understand design responsibility, and in tandem, to teach
this responsibility without explicitly invoking character education? One obvious avenue—
altogether neglected by moral philosophers and psychologists—resides within the
quintessential act of design itself.
On this, Meadows (2008) presents a possibility where responsibility could be designed. In
her example of designing a new town, the designer could specify that all parties that emit
wastewater into a stream to place their intake pipes downstream from their outflow pipes
(Meadows, 2008: 179). This way of conceiving design is however not new. Burckhardt (2012)
calls this the invisible parameters of design in contrast to visible and materialized
parameters. In this case, the designer who recognizes that the moral hazards of free-riding
begin in the materialized (or visible) counterparts of pipes and drains is then able to design a
complete—and responsible—system: one which no longer divides the world into a realm of
objects and (invisible) institutions. A designer who is able to do this clearly understands
responsibility beyond professional ethics on the one hand, and on the other hand, is
motivated to actualize this moral insight through design. One then wonders if responsibility
could then be taught neither through theoretical ethics nor character education, but
practiced through such a unified form of design itself.
Even so, this approach is not without its own set of problems. Empirically, designers work in
systems that are inherited, and formed by, prior design attempts. Considering Meadows’s
specific example, one could argue that it is very rare for a designer to have complete
discretion over a complete design system. But more importantly, design ethics again
questions if designers ought to be given this discretion—even if it were possible—to design
responsibility. In contrast to Latour’s (1992) version on moral artefacts—for example
automatic door-closers and automated seatbelts, which ‘clean up after us (i.e., the
irresponsible ‘us’)’—Meadows’s approach alters something deeper and more systemic in the
constitution of our lifeworlds. On surface it appears to naturalize the volition for
responsibility. But in substance, this volition is merely obliged by the starker realities of selfpreservation.
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5. Conclusion: A Modest Proposal
Engaging the three separate discourses of technology, sustainability and responsibility
respectively in this paper, I have demonstrated how examining each discourse could yield its
own issues, questions, and insights for design ethics. In each discourse, the connections to
design were clarified and following this, a few conceptual blockades for design ethics were
also identified. Specifically by ‘blockades’, I am referring to the epistemological limits in what
design ethics assumes as its operative paradigm. For example in technology, design ethics
can continue to advance fruitfully within the instrumentalist paradigm of technology. But
what design ethics is able to claim will likely be limited by the foundational assumption of
this paradigm, which is the instrumentalist view of technology. Or design ethics can switch
tack to explore the mediation paradigm, where as discussed, knowledge remains uncertain.
But this is precisely the epistemological territory where thoughtful discussions are most
needed from the design disciplines. It is therefore not unreasonable to consider that future
work on advancing design ethics lies in surmounting known blockades, or dissolving them
altogether. Insofar as the identified blockades in this paper are genuine—or so the author
tried to ensure that they are—then my arguments have contributed to design ethics by
making its working targets clearer.
Subsequently, in seeking to understand design ethics through these three discourses, one
quickly discovers how design is beginning to alter the very conception of ethics as the “direct
dealing of man with man” (Jonas, 1984: 4). In other words, has ethics, as it is conventionally
understood, been transformed by the capacity to design? In pondering this question either
through the issues raised by the design of autonomous technologies, or the ones implied by
the act of designing responsibility, design ethics comes close to a form of ethics of design
rather than ethics for design. While the latter involves applying existing ethical frameworks
and principles to evaluate design actions—which also render design ethics indifferent from
any other field of applied ethics—the former is resoundingly a new epistemological
category. In ethics of design, it is implied that the capacity of design has developed far
enough to engender its own ethical issues and perhaps, even alter the conception of ethics
itself. After all, how should designers or philosophers even come to terms with a capacity
that when fully exercised, extends to specifying the fabric of responsibility itself?
Finally, if my limited but systematic review of literature pertaining to ethics (or ethical
discussions) in design over the last fifty years is any indication, writings on ethics have always
been sporadic. Yet in recent years, writings on ethics have in fact thinned—and this is taking
into account the relevant ethical discussions on design mounted from other discourses,
which this paper attempts to account for three of them. For a subject matter that has
become visibly important, an inverse trend and attention on ethics in design is more than
disconcerting. To this I entreat a modest proposal: if all scholarly and professional reports or
papers in design henceforth could include a short section on ethics, design may well find
itself in the diametrical scenario with much emerging content on ethics. But this I reckon as
a happier—and necessary—scenario than a poverty of ethical discourse in present day
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design. In doing this, it is highly likely that design ethics, which occupies the seat of an
afterthought in design studies today, can shift to the spot of design’s precondition.
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